REAL ESTATE LAW TAYLOR v. RANCHO SANTA BARBARA (3/21/00 - No. 9856204)-Rational-Basis Review

 

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U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

TAYLOR v RANCHO SANTA BARBARA
9856204

MICHAEL SHAWN TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RANCHO SANTA BARBARA, a
California General Partnership,
and its general partners; CUERVO
No. 98-56204
CORP., a California Corporation;
D.C. No.
KENNETH E. ECKERT, and LORENA J.
CV-98-01422-CBM
ECKERT, Co-Trustees of the Lorena
J. Eckert Trust; WARREN J.                            OPINION
HOWLAND, Trustee of the Warren
J. Howland Trust; MARGARET S.
HOWLAND; and FREDERICK RICE,
Trustee of the Frederick Rice
Trust,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
February 17, 2000--Pasadena, California

Filed March 21, 2000

Before: James R. Browning, Alfred T. Goodwin, and
Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Goodwin

_________________________________________________________________
SUMMARY 
 
The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, 
is copyrighted C 2000 by West Group. 
_________________________________________________________________

Real Estate/Land Use and Zoning

The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of the district
court. The court held that the "housing-for-older-persons"
exemptions of the Federal Housing Act (FHA) and Califor-
nia's Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL) do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause by authorizing the exclusion from
mobile home parks of persons below age 55.

After appellant Michael Shawn Taylor bought a mobile
home located in appellee Rancho Santa Barbara (RSB), a
mobile home park, he applied for a rental agreement. RSB's
policy was to rent only to persons over age 55. As a result,
Taylor, who was 41, would have to wait 14 years to move into
his mobile home.

RSB's age rule was permitted by the FHA, as amended by
the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Housing
for Older Persons Act (HOPA).

Taylor sued RSB, alleging that the MRL violates the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and that the
FHA violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which applies equal protection standards to the states.

The district court ruled that the statutory schemes did not
violate equal protection because they were based on rational
legislative policy decisions. Accordingly, the court granted a
defense motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Taylor
appealed.

[1] Under the FHA, as amended by HOPA, a community
can qualify for the housing-for-older-persons exemption pro-
vided that at least 80 percent of the occupied units are occu-
pied by at least one person who is age 55 or older. RSB
qualified for the exemption.

[2] The exemption survives equal protection challenge.
Congress intended the FHAA to protect families with children
while protecting the rights of senior citizens who live in
retirement communities, and allowing those communities to
exclude families with children if they so choose.

[3] The housing-for-older-persons exemption bears a ratio-
nal relationship to the government's legitimate interest in pre-
serving and promoting housing for older persons. Congress
reasonably determined that older persons have a particular
need for an affordable, safe, supportive environment.

[4] That Congress drew the line at age 55 does not violate
equal protection. The selection of age accommodates those
who retire early and those who desire to relocate prior to
reaching retirement or very old age. Furthermore, legislatures
are given leeway under rational-basis review to engage in
such line-drawing.

[5] The MRL exemption of mobile home parks is rationally
related to the legitimate interest of promoting affordable hous-
ing for older persons. [6] The MRL creates a special benefit
for older people on mobile home parks--the right to exclude
young purchasers. By providing this benefit, California con-
ceivably promotes the supply of mobile home parks for older
persons. [7] The California Supreme Court has upheld the
MRL against equal protection challenges by young would-be
purchasers wishing to live in an adults-only mobile home
park. [8] California did not act arbitrarily or irrationally by
giving disparate treatment to mobile home parks for older per-
sons.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Robert O. Angle, Angle, Carlson, Goldrick & Roberts, Santa
Barbara, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Terry R. Dowdall, Orange, California, for the defendants-
appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

Michael Shawn Taylor, age 41, bought a mobile home that
was located in a mobile home park, which rents the lot under
the privately owned unit to qualified renters. When Taylor
learned that spaces would not be rented to persons under 55
years of age, he sued in the district court to challenge as
unconstitutional the state and federal statutes that permit park
operators to enforce age restrictions. He appeals the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of his claim. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we affirm.

The federal Fair Housing Act and California's Mobilehome
Residency Law permit otherwise qualified mobile home parks
to refuse to rent to tenants aged under 55 years. Apparently
for the first time in this circuit, these laws are challenged as
inconsistent with the equal protection accretions to the Fifth
Amendment, for 42 U.S.C. S 3607 (b)(2)(C), and the Four-
teenth Amendment, for California Civil Code S 798.76.

I. BACKGROUND

As apparently is common among mobile home parks, Ran-
cho Santa Barbara rents to mobile home owners the spaces
upon which the homes rest. Taylor found and purchased a
home to his liking, and then applied for a rental agreement.
His application was rejected because of his age. As published
in park rules, Rancho Santa Barbara restricts occupancy to
persons 55 years old or older. Taylor found that he had 14
years to wait before he could move into his unit.

The parties agree that the park's age rule is permitted by
both federal and state statutes. The Federal Housing Act
(FHA), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 (FHAA) and the Housing for Older Persons Act
(HOPA), permits landlords to restrict occupancy to persons
55 years of age or older. See 42 U.S.C.S 3607(b)(2)(C). Cali-
fornia's Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL) authorizes man-
agement of a mobile home park to limit residence on the basis
of age, provided that the age restriction complies with the
FHA. See Cal. Civ. Code S 798.76. The MRL operates as an
exception to California's general proscription of age discrimi-
nation in housing. See Cal. Civ. Code SS 51.2, 51.3(c)(4).

Taylor argues that the MRL violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and that the FHA, as
amended by HOPA, violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause, which applies equal protection standards to the
federal government. See Weinberger v. Weisenfeld , 420 U.S.
636, 638 (1975) (holding that the approach to Fifth Amend-
ment equal protection claims is "precisely the same" as under
Fourteenth Amendment). The district court held that both stat-
utory schemes survived equal protection challenge as founded
upon rational policy decisions by the respective legislative
bodies, and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

We review the correctness of the judgment as a question of
law. See Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.
1997). The facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted
and true for purposes of the appeal. See id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rational-Basis Review Applies

We apply rational-basis review to the challenged legisla-
tion. Age classifications are not constitutionally suspect, and
legislative distinctions based upon age warrant only tradi-
tional rational-basis review. See, e.g. , Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645-47 (2000); United States v.
Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding dif-
ferent treatment accorded youth offenders). Furthermore, Tay-
lor alleges no fundamental right that is infringed by the
challenged legislation.

Applying rational-basis review, the classification survives
equal protection challenge if there is a rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose. See Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312
, 320
(1993). Under rational-basis review, a legislature "need not
actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale sup-
porting its classification. Instead, a classification must be
upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that
could provide a rational-basis for the classification." Id.
(internal quotation marks and string citations omitted). Courts
reviewing for a rational basis must accept a legislature's gen-
eralizations even when there is an imperfect fit between
means and ends; "mathematical nicety" is not required. Id. at
321.

B. The Federal Fair Housing Act (As Amended) 

In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA to prohibit home sell-
ers and landlords from discriminating on the basis of race,
religion, national origin, or (later) gender. See Title VIII of
Pub.L. 90-284 (Apr. 11, 1968); 42 U.S.C. SS 3601 et seq. In
1988, Congress enacted the FHAA, which amended the FHA
and prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of familial
status, but Congress provided an exemption for retirement
housing communities. Under the FHAA, a housing commu-
nity could discriminate on the basis of familial status if
(1) 80% of the dwellings were occupied by at least one person
age 55 or older and the community provided "significant ser-
vices and facilities" for older persons; or  if (2) the housing
community was reserved exclusively (100%) for persons age
62 or older. See 42 U.S.C. S 3607(b)(1), (2).

The "significant services and facilities" requirement
sparked controversy and litigation in the years following the
FHAA's enactment in 1988. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development issued no fewer than three regulatory
attempts to clarify the clause, but the requirement continued
to generate public scrutiny. The central criticism was that the
exemption for older persons' housing had "proved difficult to
implement" and resulted in numerous lawsuits and adminis-
trative complaints. Covey v. Hollydale Mobile Home Estates,
116 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1997).

[1] Subsequently, Congress by a 424 to 5 margin enacted
HOPA and eliminated the "significant facilities and services"
requirement. See Pub.L. No. 104-76, 109 Stat. 787 (Dec. 28,
1995). Under the current version of the FHA, as amended by
HOPA, a community can qualify for the housing-for-older-
persons exemption provided that "at least 80 percent of the
occupied units are occupied by at least one person who is 55
years of age or older." 42 U.S.C. S 3607(b)(2)(C)(i) (1996).
Rancho Santa Barbara qualifies for the exemption as currently
enacted. For this appeal, we will assume that the park would
not have qualified for the pre-HOPA exemption, because Tay-
lor alleges that the park offers no special facilities or services.

HOPA's elimination of the "significant services and
facilities" requirement was rationally related to the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in reducing confusion regarding the
FHA and its housing-for-older-persons exemption. As stated
by Representative Canady, "[t]he term `significant facilities
and services' has been a source of confusion and litigation
since the passage of the [FHAA]." 141 Cong. Rec. H14966-
02 (Dec. 18, 1995). Representative Brown echoed this con-
cern: "[T]he `significant facilities and services' standard has
. . . been a pain in the neck because it has been vague, it has
been difficult, and it has spawned litigation and created
confusion." 141 Cong. Rec. S18063-01 at *S18064 (Dec. 6,
1995). Congress reasonably concluded that eliminating the
"significant facilities and services" requirement would make
the FHA easier to administer and easier to follow. Cf. Covey,
116 F.3d at 833 (noting that requirement "proved difficult to
implement").

[2] The housing-for-older-persons exemption itself, as it
stands amended by HOPA, likewise survives equal protection
challenge. Congress intended the FHAA to protect families
with children while still "fully protect[ing ] the rights of senior
citizens who live in retirement communities, and . .. allow-
[ing] those communities to exclude families with children if
they so choose." 134 Cong. Rec. H4607 (daily ed. June 22,
1988). Two courts outside this circuit have upheld the pre-
HOPA housing-for-older-persons exemption. See Seniors
Civil Liberties Coalition v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th
Cir. 1992), (holding that exemption did not violate due pro-
cess rights of aged); Park Place Home Brokers v. P-K Mobile
Home Park, 773 F.Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that
exemption did not violate equal protection rights of landown-
ers). With the enactment of HOPA, Congress reasserted its
intent to protect housing for older persons by broadening and
simplifying the housing-for-older-persons exemption.

[3] The housing-for-older-persons exemption as amended
bears a rational relationship to the government's legitimate
interest in preserving and promoting housing for older per-
sons. Congress reasonably determined that older persons have
a particular need for an affordable "safe, supportive
environment." 141 Cong. Rec. S18063-01 (Dec. 6, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Brown). Many live on fixed incomes, have
particular health needs, and may no longer need a home big
enough for a large family.

The housing-for-older-persons exemption permits exempt-
ed communities to reduce costs. The exemption permits com-
munities to exist in areas less appropriate or desirable for
younger people. Sites typically lack schools or day care facili-
ties. Parks can thrive relatively far from employment centers.
The land can be acquired at low cost, and often might other-
wise go underused. Senator Feinstein addressed related mat-
ters during the debates leading up to the enactment of HOPA.

       In the city of Hemet, 50 percent of its housing is 55-
       and-over communities. Removing the seniors-only
       status and requiring these communities to absorb
       families with children will result in a dramatic short-
       age of classroom space, and [affect] the tax-base.
       Demographics are such that the financing of new
       school construction, in a city that was planned as a
       retirement community, would not be possible.

141 Cong.Rec. S18063-01 at *S18066.

The exemption also allows exempted housing communities
to offer facilities more appropriate for older persons than for
children. For example, communities can devote fewer
resources to ensure quiet privacy and child safety. They can
build thinner walls, smaller units, and tinier yards. Con-
versely, communities can devote more resources to facilities
and services for older persons. Even though the FHA does not
require such facilities, the exemption might rationally pro-
mote enhanced services.

[4] That Congress drew the line at age 55 -- rather than at
age 35 or 65 or 67 -- does not violate equal protection. The
selection of age 55 accommodates those who retire early and
those who desire to relocate prior to reaching retirement or
very old age, when moving might be more difficult. Further-
more, even though the selection of age 55 -- or any age --
might be over and underinclusive on the margin, legislatures
are given leeway under rational-basis review to engage in
such line drawing. In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307
, 312-23, 316 (1976), the selection of
age 50 for mandatory retirement of police officers survived
rationality review, even though some officers older than 50
were in better health than some officers younger than 50. That
Taylor could construct an alternative statute, one that he
would prefer, or that would more narrowly fit the discussed
purposes, does not mean that the statute as Congress drafted
it is unconstitutional.

C. California's Mobilehome Residency Law

California's MRL also survives rationality review. The
MRL operates as an exception to California's general pro-
scription of age discrimination in housing and permits a
mobile home park to restrict residence on the basis of age,
provided that the restriction "complies with the federal Fair
Housing Act." Cal. Civ. Code S 798.76 (MRL); see also Cal.
Civ. Code SS 51.2, 51.3(c)(4) (general proscription of age dis-
crimination).

[5] Taylor contends that the California scheme is even
more arbitrary than the federal scheme -- and thus even more
clearly violative of equal protection -- because it allows dis-
crimination against those under 55 in mobile home housing
while prohibiting the same discrimination in all other forms
of housing. We reject this claim, because the MRL exemption
of mobile home parks is rationally related to the legitimate
interest of promoting affordable housing for older persons.

[6] The MRL creates a special benefit for older people in
mobile home parks -- the right to exclude young purchasers.
By providing this benefit, California conceivably promotes
the supply of mobile home parks for older persons. As dis-
cussed above with respect to older persons' housing in gen-
eral, the exemption allows mobile homes to exist in more
remote areas and be tailored towards the needs of older per-
sons.

[7] Mobile home parks offer several distinct characteristics
that make such housing a particularly desirable option for
many older people. In Schmidt v. Superior Court , 48 Cal.3d
370 (1989), the California Supreme Court relied upon the dis-
tinguishing features of mobile homes and upheld the MRL
against equal protection challenge brought by young would-
be purchasers wishing to live in an adults-only mobile home
park.

Mobile home parks offer small units sitting on small lots,
necessarily offering limited privacy and limited room for chil-
dren. The Schmidt court also recognized "the greater expense
that might have to be incurred in rendering such a park safe
for children residents." Id. at 390. Additionally, mobile home
parks are particularly adaptable to inexpensive land away
from schools and major economic centers. The parks can be
built on minimally improved land, without producing suffi-
cient revenue to make them a viable occupant of more expen-
sive real estate.

Furthermore, mobile homes as a class usually are less
expensive than other types of housing, which makes them
marketable to persons living on fixed incomes during, or in
preparation for, retirement. According to Taylor's own sub-
missions, a two-bedroom mobile home in the area around
Santa Barbara sells for roughly $50,000, whereas a compara-
ble two-bedroom condominium in the same area sells for
roughly three times as much. Providing a special housing ben-
efit to older persons is neither irrational nor illegitimate.

[8] According to a survey taken shortly before passage of
the FHAA, 72 percent of mobile home park residents in Cali-
fornia were age 55 or older. See Cal. Dept. of Housing &
Community Development, Mobilehome Parks in California:
A Survey of Mobilehome Park Owners Pursuant to SB 1835
p. 31 (Feb. 1986); Schmidt, 48 Cal.3d at 390. Those demo-
graphics support the contention that mobile home parks offer
distinguishing features making them particularly attractive to
older people. California did not act arbitrarily or irrationally
by giving disparate treatment to mobile home parks for older
persons.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the challenged legislative schemes do not
deprive the plaintiff of equal protection under the laws,
because the legislative schemes are rationally related to legiti-
mate state interests. Thus, the plaintiff fails to state a constitu-
tional claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM.


 

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